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Abstract—As Hardware Trojans (HTs) emerges as the new 
threats for the integrated circuits (ICs), methods for identifying 
and detecting HTs have been widely researched and proposed. 
Identifying the HTs are important because it can assist in 
developing proper techniques for inserting and detecting the 
treat in ICs. One of the recent method of identifying and 
detecting HTs in ICs is classification using machine learning 
(ML) algorithm. There is still lack of machine learning-based 
classification for HTs identification. Thus, a three type of ML 
based classification includes Decision Tree (DT), K-Nearest 
Neighbor (KNN) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) are 
proposed for HTs identification. The dataset is based from the 
Trust-Hub. In order to improve the classification accuracy, the 
HTs are discretized based on their dominant attributes. The 
discretized HTs are classified using three machine learning 
algorithms. The results show that the DT and KNN learnt model 
are able to correctly predict about 83% of the test data. 
 
Index Terms—Classification; Hardware Trojan; Machine 
Learning; TrustHub. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The hardware Trojan (HT) is a new emerging type of 
hardware attack for integrated circuits (ICs) and has become 
an important research topic in recent years. The impacts from 
HTs are malicious such as leaking sensitive user information 
or disabling or altering the functionality of an IC. For 
instance, in 2007, an incoming air strike bypassed the Syrian 
radar which is due to the backdoor that were built into the 
system's chips [1]. In another case, it was exposed that HTs 
were directly implanted into USB protocol or port by the 
Quantum program of US National Security Agency (NSA) in 
2014 [1] to acquire secret data from all over the world not 
only from Russian and China’s military, but also from the 
trading information from EU and Mexican’s law enforcement 
and drug cartel computer system. 
The structure of HTs comprises of triggers and payloads. 
The triggers are defined as the mechanism to activate the HTs 
while the payloads are the resulting effects from the HTs. To 
avoid detection, the HTs are typically stay dormant in the IC 
until they are triggered by rare signals or events [1]. Upon 
occurrences of the specified signal or event, the activated 
payload circuit begins to implement malicious functions. The 
triggers of the HTs are usually intelligently designed which  
they will not be induced during simulation or testing but 
only occur by covert field operation. In order to recognize 
these HTs, a number of typical HT-inserted benchmark 
circuits are developed in the TrustHub website [2]. The HTs 
benchmarks circuits database are created based on six factors: 
the insertion phase, abstraction level, activation mechanism, 
effect, location and physical characteristics. The insertion 
phase of the HTs may occur in either specification, design, 
fab, test or assembly. As for the abstraction level, the HTs 
may exist either at system or development, register-transfer 
level (RTL), gate or physical. The type of activation 
mechanism could be always-on with either being triggered 
internally or externally. The effect of the HTs could be either 
change functionality or degrade performance or leaking 
information or Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The component 
of ICs that contain HTs (location) can be either at processors, 
memory, power supply or clock grid. The physical 
characteristics of the HTs depends on either distribution, size, 
parameter, functionality or layout. All the elements of these 
six factors are used to assist the classification of HTs. By 
correctly identify types of the HTs, the techniques for the 
insertion and detection of these HTs can be methodically 
developed. 
One of the techniques for identification and detection of 
HTs is the classification. The classification of HTs can be 
performed either using mathematical models such as 
algebraic matrix [3, 5] or machine leaning algorithms [7-12]. 
There are only few approaches of identifying HTs using 
machine learning- based classification have been developed 
such as in [7] compared to the approaches in detection of HTs 
[8-12]. This is because the identification of HTs are still 
immature since there are more HTs that are yet anticipated 
and recognized. As for the HTs detection, techniques such as 
frequency-domain power differences [9], reverse engineering 
(RE) [8] and macro synchronous micro asynchronous 
(MSMA) [10] are utilized. Then, the machine learning 
algorithms play role to enhance the detection by the above 
techniques. This process can be simplified by emphasizing on 
proper identification of the HTs using machine learning-
based classification before the detection techniques are 
developed, thereby avoiding the redundant usage of machine 
learning based classification at the detection stage. 
In this paper, an identification of HTs using machine 
learning based classification is proposed. The identification 
of HTs are based on the benchmark circuits in Trust-Hub [2]. 
The procedures of developing the machine learning-based 
identification of HTs are divided into three steps. The first 
steps are initial learning where the class of the HTs are set to 
its default HT design name. Then, the discretize algorithm is 
used for learning the features. Three machine learning 
algorithms were used for classification of the HTs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents related work for identification and detection of HTs. 
The proposed work of developing a machine learning-based 
classification identification of HTs is explained in Section III. 
Section IV discusses result of using proposed algorithm. 
Finally, Section V concludes the finding and analysis of the 
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result. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
 
To further understand the motivation behind this study, the 
literatures that discuss the classification techniques for 
identification and detection of HTs either using machine 
learning-based algorithm are reviewed as follows: 
 
A. Classifying for the Identification of HTs 
The first attempt of using classification technique to 
identify HTs is made by [4] where the HTs were classified 
based on five attributes: design cycle phase, abstraction level, 
triggers, effects and physical location. By organizing a HT 
design competition on tertiary level, the diverse set of HTs 
are compiled and classified based on these five attributes. 
This initial dataset of HTs is further standardized in [2] by 
developing vulnerability analysis flow and detectability 
metric. The HTs are implemented based on the hard-to-detect 
areas that is determined by the vulnerability analysis flow. 
The detectability of the HTs are evaluated using Trojan 
detectability metric. In [3], a classification technique using 
algebraic method was developed to identify the missing 
attributes in HTs dataset from TrustHub. It is claimed that by 
using this technique, all HTs in TrustHub are properly 
classified compared to the classification technique in [2] and 
[4]. This technique was then automated using online tool 
called Hardware Trojan System (HTS) [5]. 
Another classification technique called score-based 
classification are developed in [6] to identify HT-free or HT- 
infected circuit without using golden netlist. Two types of 
class: weak and strong are developed for score-based 
technique. In the weak classification, Trojan nets are 
classified into nine cases and each case is given a score. The 
nets are classified as Trojan nets if they have maximum score 
that is less than 3, maximum constant cycle that is more than 
999996 cycles and the maximum score net count that is less 
than 5. This score-based technique is claimed to be able to 
detect all HTs in selected benchmark circuits in TrustHub 
compared to UCI and VeriTrust techniques. For classification 
technique that is based on machine learning algorithm, SVM 
is used in [7] to identify between normal and Trojan nets in a 
set of gate level netlist. 
The features that are used to classify these nets are logic 
gate fan-in (LGFi), flip-flop input (FFi), flip-flop output 
(FFo), primary input (PI) and primary output (PO). These 
extracted features are learned using SVM based on three 
conditions: no weighting, static weighting and dynamic 
weighting. For no weighting, SVM learned the normal and 
Trojan nets as their default quantities. 
For static weighting, the SVM learned the normal nets as 
their default quantities while the Trojan nets as their original 
quantity was multiplied by weight, W. For dynamic 
weighting, the SVM learned the normal nets as their default 
quantities while the Trojan nets as the quantity of normal nets. 
The accuracy of identifying the HTs are 80% or higher with 
dynamic weighting. 
 
B. Classifying for the Detection of HTs 
Compared to HTs identification, there are more literatures 
on developing machine learning-based classification for HT 
detection. In [8], an SVM-based approach was developed to 
assist RE in detecting HTs. This approach eliminated the last 
two steps: annotation and schematic creation in RE. The 
features were extracted from the first three steps of RE wihout 
labels. To solve this, one class v-SVM is used as the class for 
this training sample. This type of SVM has values between 
‘0’ and ‘1’ and these values were determined by the decision 
boundary that closely surrounds the training sample. This 
approach achieved higher accuracy with higher v and lower 
noise margin. 
Another machine learning-based classification for HTs 
detection is developed in [9] by converting the differences in 
power consumption between HT-free and HT-infected 
circuits into frequency domain and this converted power 
consumption was used as the training data using SVM. This 
technique is able to detect the all HTs in the AES circuit. A 
self- learning framework was developed in [10] to detect HTs 
in IC. The framework was constructed by integrating the 
MSMA detection technique with machine learning 
algorithms such as decision tree (DT), K-Nearest Neighbor 
(KNN) and Bayesian classifiers. The power, delay, current 
and frequency of the golden IC were extracted as attributes 
and were trained using the stated machine learning 
algorithms. The model was then used along with MSMA 
during the testing phase to detect HTs. The achieved 
accuracies using each model was relatively high where the 
accuracies were 95.19% using DT, 93.5% using BC and 
93.12% using KNN. 
In [11], a run-time Trojan detection architecture for custom 
many-core was developed using KNN, DT, Linear 
Regression (LR) and SVM. There are four features: source 
core number, destination core number, packet transfer path 
and total distance at each router hop that are extracted in order 
to detect communication-based HTs such as traffic diversion, 
routing loop and core spoofing. After all these features were 
extracted, they were trained using KNN, DT, LR and SVM to 
evaluate their accuracy in detecting all the communication-
based HTs. From the learnt model, two analyses are 
performed: accuracy analysis where showed that SVM and 
DT is the best (94%- 100%) and hardware complexity 
analysis where showed that SVM was the best option in term 
of computation and memory requirement. Thus SVM is 
selected for developing the HTs detection architecture for 
many-core platform. This SVMbased technique had 93% 
accuracy in detecting the mentioned communication-based 
HTs. This technique was further enhanced in [12] to secure 
design from new attacks introduced at real-time. To serve this 
purpose, Modified Balanced Winnow (MBW), online 
machine learning algorithm was utilized using the attach 
detection module (ADM). This enhanced technique has 5% 
to 8% higher detection accuracy for communication-based 
HTs compared to SVM and KNN. 
Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that there is 
still lack of machine learning-based algorithm for identifying 
the HTs compared to detecting HTs. However, the utilization 
of machine learning-based classification in HTs detection are 
complex since it is tailored to the detection techniques that 
are used. Thus, this process can be simplified given that 
proper HTs identification are performed using the machine 
learning- based classification prior to the HTs detection. 
 
III. PROPOSED WORK 
 
The method of classifying for the identification of the HTs 
using machine learning algorithms begins by tabulating the 
HTs in the Trust-Hub benchmark [2] as the training data. The 
taxonomies are used as the attributes where their contents are 
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represented by either ‘1’ to indicate TRUE or ‘0’ to signify 
FALSE. As for the attributes with all null values, they are 
omitted from the training data before the learning is 
performed. Once the training data is ready, it is learnt using 
the MATLAB Classification Learner Apps. The accuracy of 
the model is observed and improved by discretizing the class 
according to similar attributes. The learning is repeated using 
MATLAB Classification Learner Apps until best accuracy is 
achieved. After the best accuracy is achieved, the selected 
models are used for predicting analysis of hardware Trojan 
[4]. 
 
A. Process of Initial Learning of Hardware Trojan  
Using MATLAB R2015a and later, the Statistics and 
Machine Learning Toolbox provide an apps called 
‘Classification Learner’ which allow user to train and validate 
using different types of classifiers. The Classification Learner 
Apps has four available classifiers such as decision trees, 
SVM, KNN and ensembles.  
The process initial learning of Hardware Trojan data using 
the Classification Learner Apps requires four (4) steps. The 
steps include:  
Step 1: The user is required to select the dataset  
Step 2: A response features are selected from one of the 
attributes while the other attributes are set as the predictors.  
Step 3: User are required to select a validation model. In 
order to guarantee that the best model performance is 
acquired, the validation model must be decided before the 
training is executed. There are two types of validation: cross 
and holdout. In this experiment, the cross validation is 
selected since the dataset is small. 
Step 4: Next, the classifier is selected for training and 
predicting analysis of the feature of HTs. Once the training 
was done, the result is shown based on the confusion matrix. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Originally, there are 12 group of HTs according to design 
modules in the Trust-Hub benchmark [2]. The design 
modules that are injected with the hardware Trojan are AES, 
b15, b19, basic RSA, EthernetMAC, 8051microcontroller, 
multi- pyramid, PIC16F84, RS232, scan flip-flops, vga-lcd 
and WISHBONE conmax. Since the accuracies using each 
group of HTs as the class is moderate, then to improve the 
classification accuracy of the features, the discretization 
methods is applied for HTs. Table 1 tabulates the classes of 
discretized group of HTs.  
All the AES-based HT except AES-T1800, AES-T1900 
and AES-T500 are grouped with BasicRSA-T100 and 
BasicRSA-T300 in Class 1 based on their “Leak Information’ 
attributes. On the other hand, AES-T1800, AES-T1900 and 
AES-T500 are grouped with all the b15-based HT, 
BasicRSA- T200 and BasicRSA-T400 in Class 2 based on 
their commonality in ‘DoS’ attribute. As for Class 3, all the 
scan flip-flops based HT, vga-lcd-T100 and all PIC16F84-
based HT are grouped together based on their commonality 
in ‘Processor’ attribute. Class 4 has all MultPyramid-based 
HTs, EthernetMAC10GE-T700, EthernetMAC10GE-T710, 
EthernetMAC10GE-T720 and EthernetMAC10GE-T730 
which are grouped based on their “Fab” attribute. For Class 
5, it contains all MC8051-based HT, b19-T300, b19-T400 
and b19-T500 which are grouped based on their “RTL” 
attribute. In Class 6, the EthernetMAC10GE-T700, 
EthernetMAC10GE- T710, EthernetMAC10GE-T720, 
EthernetMAC10GE-T730, b19-T100, b19-T200, RS232-
T1000, RS232-T1100, RS232- T1200, RS232-T1300, 
RS232-T1400, RS232-T1500 and RS232-T1600 are grouped 
together based on their “Change Functionality” attribute. 
Finally, Class 7 comprises of RS232- T1700, RS232-T1800, 
RS232-T1900, RS232-T2000, RS232- T200, RS232-T300, 
RS232-T400, RS232-T500, RS232-T600, RS232-T700, 
RS232-T800, RS232-T900, RS232-T901 and all 
wb_conmax-based HT which are grouped based on 
“Internally Triggered” attribute.  
 
Table 1 HTS Discretization 
 
Discretized HT Class  Attributes HT Group  
Class 1 Leak 
Information 
1. All AES-based HT 
except AES-T1800, 
AES-T1900, AES- T500 
2. BasicRSA-T100 and 
BasicRSA-T300 
Class 2 DOS 1. AES-T1800, AES-
T1900, AES-T500 
2. All b15-based HT 
3. Basic RSA-T200 and 
BasicRSA-T400 
Class 3 Processor 1. All flip-flop -
based HT  
2. VGA-LCD-
T100 
3. All PIC16F84-
based HT 
Class 4 Fab 1. All EthernetMAC10GE-
based HT except 
EthernetMAC10GE- 
T700, 
EthernetMAC10GE- 
T710, 
EthernetMAC10GE-T720 
and EthernetMAC10GE-
T730 2.MultPyramid 
based HT 
Class 5 RTL 1. b19-T300, b19-T400 and 
b19- T500 
2. All MC8051-based HT 
Class 6 Change 
functionality 
1. EthernetMAC10GE-
T700, 
EthernetMAC10GE-
T710, 
EthernetMAC10GE-
T720 and 
EthernetMAC10GE-
T730 
2. b19-T100 and b19-
T200 
3. RS232-T1000, RS232-
T1100, RS232-T1200, 
RS232-T1300, RS232-
T1400, RS232-T1500 
and RS232-T1600 
Class 7 Internal 
Triggered 
1. RS232-T1700, RS232-
T1800, RS232-T1900, 
RS232-T2000, RS232-
T200, RS232-T300, 
RS232-T400, RS232-
T500, RS232-T600, 
RS232-T700, RS232-
T800, RS232-T900 and 
RS232-T901 
2. All wb_conmax-based 
HT 
 
Now that all the hardware Trojan are discretized according 
their dominance in certain attributes, they will be classified 
using the Classification Learner Apps tool to see whether 
their accuracies are improved or not. Table 2 shows the result 
accuracy for HTs. The table tabulates the achieved accuracy 
for each decision tree, SVM and KNN models. It can be seen 
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from the table that the best accuracy for the decision tree 
model is 76.1 %. As for the SVM model, the best accuracy is 
70.7%, while the best accuracy for the KNN model is 71.7% 
These accuracies must be further improved to ensure the HTs 
features are classified correctly. 
 
Table 2 
Accuracy of HTs  
 
Model 
Classification Accuracy 
(%) 
Decision Trees (medium split) 76.1 
SVM (quadratic kernel) 70.1 
KNN (weighted K=10) 71.1 
 
A. Hardware Trojan Classification using Discretization 
Algorithm 
Table 3 shows the comparison result classification based 
on discretization algorithm. 
 
Table 3 
Classification Accuracy with Discretization Algorithm 
 
Model 
Classification Accuracy 
(%) 
Decision Trees (medium split) 87.0 
SVM (quadratic kernel) 85.9 
KNN (weighted K=10) 89.1 
 
Based on Table 3, it shows that the result accuracy is 
improved for each decision tree, SVM and KNN models after 
applying the discretization algorithm with the three 
classifiers. It can be seen from the table that the best accuracy 
for the decision tree model now rises to 87.0%. As for the 
SVM model, the best accuracy is improved to 85.9%. The 
best accuracy for the KNN model is climbed to 89.1%. It can 
be seen from the table that all the accuracies for each 
classification model are improved by 14% to 25%. With these 
improved accuracies, the models are ready to be used for 
predicting analysis. 
Then, for predicting analysis, a total of 37 HTs are 
extracted from ten finalists of Embedded System Challenge 
2008 [4]. These finalists were asked to design HTs for crypto-
hardware platform, Alpha that implemented the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) on Digilent BASYS Spartan-3 
FPGA board. The main processor on the board interacted with 
Alpha through an RS232 serial port. There are 256 shared 
secret keys are hard coded into Alpha. Leaking these secret 
keys or obtaining the unencrypted messages is the objective 
of the finalists as the attackers. The user of the device selected 
a private key using the switches. The encrypted data was sent 
through the RS-232 port. Alpha emulated a real world crypto 
accelerator, typically used to secure communications in a 
hostile environment. 
All the HTs that are designed by the finalists are made for 
the predicting analysis. The data for predicting analysis will 
be based on the test data. All the features of HTs are classified 
with the three (3) classifiers: Decision Tree (DT), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) with 
discretization algorithm. The label for predicted class comes 
from class attribute includes leak information, DoS, 
Processor, Fab, change functionality and internal triggered. 
 
B. Predicting Analysis based Decision Trees Classifier 
The result for predicting analysis using a test data is 
depicted in a Table 4. The table tabulates the dominant 
attribute matching of the predicted class for test data using 
decision tree learnt model. It can be seen that there are 26 
rows of test data are classified as Class 1, 2 rows of test data 
are classified as Class 2, 1 row is classified as Class 5 and 7 
rows are classified as Class 7. All 26 of test data rows that are 
predicted as Class 1 match the dominant attribute, ‘Leak 
information’. This is also true for test data rows that are 
predicted as Class 2 and Class 5 where all of them match the 
dominant attributes, ‘DoS’ and ‘RTL respectively. However, 
for test data rows that are predicted as Class 7, only 1 out of 
7 rows matches the dominant attribute, ‘Internally Triggered’. 
 
Table 4  
Dominant Attributes Matching based on Decision Tree (DT) Classifier 
 
Predicted Class 
Dominant Attribute 
for the Class 
Match to Dominant 
Attribute 
Class 1 Leak Information 26 out of 26 
Class 2 DoS 2 out of 2 
Class 5 RTL 1 out of 1 
Class 7 Internally Triggered 1 out of 7 
 
C. Predicting Analysis Based SVM Classifier 
The result for predicting analysis using a test data is 
depicted in a Table 5. The table tabulates the dominant 
attribute matching of the predicted class for test data using 
SVM learnt model. It can be seen that there are 27 rows of test 
data are classified as Class 1, 5 rows of test data are classified 
as Class 2, 3 row are classified as Class 3 and 1 rows are 
classified as Class 6. From 26 of test data rows that are 
predicted as Class 1, 21 of them match the dominant attribute, 
‘Leak information’. As for test data rows that are predicted as 
Class 3, only 1 out of 3 rows matches the dominant attribute, 
‘Processor’. However, for test data rows that predicted as 
Class 2 and Class 6, none of them matches the dominant 
attributes, ‘DoS’ and ‘Change Functionality’. 
 
Table 5  
Dominant Attributes Matching based SVM Classifier 
 
Predicted Class Dominant Attribute 
for the Class 
Match to Dominant 
Attribute 
Class 1 Leak Information 21 out of 27 
Class 2 DoS 0 out of 5 
Class 3 Processor 1 out of 3 
Class 6 Change Functionality 0 out of 1 
 
D. Predicting Analysis based K-Nearest Neighbor  
The result for predicting analysis using a test data is 
depicted in a Table 6. The table tabulates the dominant 
attribute matching of the predicted class for test data using 
decision tree learnt model. It can be seen that there are 25 
rows of test data are classified as Class 1, 2 rows of test data 
are classified as Class 2, 2 rows are classified as Class 5 and 
7 rows are classified as Class 7. All 25 of test data rows that 
are predicted as Class 1 matches the dominant attribute, ‘Leak 
information’. This is also true for test data rows that are 
predicted as Class 2 and Class 5 where all of them match the 
dominant attributes, ‘DoS’ and ‘RTL respectively. However, 
for test data rows that are predicted as Class 7, only 1 out of 
7 rows matches the dominant attribute, ‘Internally Triggered’. 
 
Table 6 
Dominant Attribute Matching based KNN 
 
Predicted Class 
Dominant Attribute 
for the Class 
Match to Dominant 
Attribute 
Class 1 Leak Information 25 out of 25 
Class 2 DoS 2 out of 2 
Class 5 RTL 2 out of 2 
Class 7 Internally Triggered 1 out of 7 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the results, it is concluded that the machine- 
learning-based classification was successfully developed for 
HTs identification. About 83% of test data were successfully 
predicted by both DT and KNN algorithm based on the 
dominant attributes for each class. As for the SVM, it 
successfully predicted about 63% of the test data. These 
results match with the classification accuracies of the learnt 
models where SVM model had less accuracy than DT and 
KNN model 
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